d3ro-voice/server/cloudflare-worker/src/origin-policy.ts

45 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript

// server/cloudflare-worker/src/origin-policy.ts
// Shared upstream origin validation helpers for the Cloudflare Edge Worker.
const IPV4_PATTERN = /^\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}$/
const INTEGER_OR_HEX_HOST_PATTERN = /^(?:0x[\da-f]+|\d+)$/i
const BLOCKED_HOST_SUFFIXES = ['.localhost', '.local', '.internal', '.home.arpa', '.localdomain']
export function hasSmuggledRequestPath(pathname: string): boolean {
return pathname.startsWith('//') || pathname.includes('\\')
}
export function isDisallowedPublicHost(rawHostname: string): boolean {
const trimmed = rawHostname.trim().toLowerCase()
if (!trimmed || trimmed.endsWith('.')) return true
if (trimmed === 'localhost') return true
if (BLOCKED_HOST_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => trimmed.endsWith(suffix))) return true
if (trimmed.startsWith('[') || trimmed.includes(':')) return true
if (IPV4_PATTERN.test(trimmed) || INTEGER_OR_HEX_HOST_PATTERN.test(trimmed)) return true
if (!trimmed.includes('.')) return true
return false
}
/**
* Validates that a configured upstream origin is strictly a clean `https://` public hostname
* with no credentials, path prefix, query string, fragment, or IP/internal literal.
* Prevents Cloudflare Error 1003 ("Direct IP access not allowed") and internal SSRF.
*/
export function parsePublicHttpsOrigin(rawOrigin: string): URL | null {
let originUrl: URL
try {
originUrl = new URL(rawOrigin.trim())
} catch {
return null
}
if (originUrl.protocol !== 'https:' || originUrl.username || originUrl.password) {
return null
}
if (originUrl.pathname !== '/' || originUrl.search !== '' || originUrl.hash !== '') {
return null
}
if (isDisallowedPublicHost(originUrl.hostname)) {
return null
}
return originUrl
}