// 드롭한 로컬 파일(file:)이 앱 창을 대체하거나 신뢰 IPC 발신자로 인정되던 문제의 회귀 테스트.
// 앱 페이지는 렌더러 디렉터리(join(__dirname, '../renderer')) 아래 HTML만이다.

import { resolve } from 'path'
import { pathToFileURL } from 'url'
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { shell } from 'electron'
import {
  appRendererFileRoot,
  hardenWebContents,
  isAllowedAppNavigation,
  isTrustedIpcSender,
} from '../../../src/main/windows/web-contents-hardening'

type Handler = (...args: unknown[]) => unknown

// 테스트에서 어댑터 모듈의 __dirname 은 src/main/windows 이므로 렌더러 루트는 src/main/renderer.
const RENDERER_ROOT = `${pathToFileURL(resolve(__dirname, '../../../src/main/renderer')).href}/`

function fakeWindow() {
  const listeners = new Map<string, Handler>()
  const webContents = {
    on: vi.fn((event: string, listener: Handler) => {
      listeners.set(event, listener)
    }),
    setWindowOpenHandler: vi.fn(),
  }
  return {
    win: { webContents } as unknown as Parameters<typeof hardenWebContents>[0],
    fire: (event: string, url: string) => {
      const preventDefault = vi.fn()
      listeners.get(event)?.({ preventDefault }, url)
      return preventDefault
    },
  }
}

beforeEach(() => {
  vi.mocked(shell.openExternal).mockClear()
})

describe('appRendererFileRoot', () => {
  it('is the renderer directory next to the main bundle, as a file URL ending in /', () => {
    expect(appRendererFileRoot()).toBe(RENDERER_ROOT)
  })
})

describe('file: navigation guard', () => {
  it('blocks a dropped HTML/audio file from replacing the app window and never opens it externally', async () => {
    const w = fakeWindow()
    hardenWebContents(w.win)
    expect(w.fire('will-navigate', 'file:///C:/Users/me/Downloads/evil.html')).toHaveBeenCalled()
    expect(w.fire('will-navigate', 'file:///C:/Users/me/Music/meeting.mp3')).toHaveBeenCalled()
    expect(w.fire('will-navigate', 'file://host/share/evil.html')).toHaveBeenCalled()
    expect(w.fire('will-redirect', 'file:///C:/Users/me/Downloads/evil.html')).toHaveBeenCalled()
    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 10))
    expect(shell.openExternal).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
  })

  it('still allows the app own renderer pages', () => {
    const w = fakeWindow()
    hardenWebContents(w.win)
    expect(w.fire('will-navigate', `${RENDERER_ROOT}index.html#/meetings`)).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
    expect(w.fire('will-navigate', `${RENDERER_ROOT}popups/result-popup/index.html`)).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
  })

  it('does not navigate to non-HTML files inside the bundle', () => {
    expect(isAllowedAppNavigation(`${RENDERER_ROOT}assets/index.js`)).toBe(false)
  })
})

describe('isTrustedIpcSender with file: senders', () => {
  it('trusts the app renderer but not arbitrary local or UNC files', () => {
    expect(isTrustedIpcSender({ senderFrame: { url: `${RENDERER_ROOT}index.html` } } as never)).toBe(true)
    expect(isTrustedIpcSender({ senderFrame: { url: 'file:///C:/Users/me/Downloads/evil.html' } } as never)).toBe(false)
    expect(isTrustedIpcSender({ senderFrame: { url: 'file://host/share/evil.html' } } as never)).toBe(false)
  })
})

describe('dev server origin', () => {
  it('keeps allowing ELECTRON_RENDERER_URL routes', () => {
    vi.stubEnv('ELECTRON_RENDERER_URL', 'http://localhost:5173')
    try {
      expect(isAllowedAppNavigation('http://localhost:5173/popups/result-popup/index.html')).toBe(true)
      expect(isTrustedIpcSender({ senderFrame: { url: 'http://localhost:5173/#/x' } } as never)).toBe(true)
      expect(isAllowedAppNavigation('file:///C:/Users/me/Downloads/evil.html')).toBe(false)
    } finally {
      vi.unstubAllEnvs()
    }
  })
})